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STRETCIllNG THE LONG-ARM IN ASAHI METAL 
INDUSTRY CO., LTD. V. SUPERIOR COURT: WORLDWIDE 
JURISDICTION AlITER WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN? 
KEVIN c. KENNED1'* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court first announced its minimum contacts standard for 
personal jurisdiction forty years ago in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton. 1 Since then, the Court has periodically refined that standard, at times 
restricting the power of the states to assert personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant,2 and at other times expanding it.3 Although the unifying themes 
in International Shoe and its progeny have been "minimum contacts," "fair 
warning," "substantial connection," and "reasonableness,"4 the decisions 
themselves have been distinguished more by their oscillations than by any 
pattern of consistency.s Nevertheless, at least one common theme emerges: 
individuals engaged in interstate transactions have been held subject to 
jurisdiction in forums with which their activities have had a close connection, 
whereas businesses engaged in interstate transactions have been held sub-
ject to jurisdiction in forums where their activities have relatively local 
effects.6 
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D. 1977, 
Wayne State University Law School; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
t 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See generally Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due 
Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77; von Mehren 
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested AnaLysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 
1121 (1966). 
2 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958). 
3 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
4 See Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2182-84. 
S Compare World-Wide -Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (the requirement of mini-
mum contacts is a function of federalism concerns) with Burger King Corp., 105 S. 
Ct. at 2182 n.13 (the requirement of minimum contacts is a function of individual 
liberty interests). 
6 An individual's contacts with the forum may be merely transitory, however, yet 
sufficientfor a state to assert jurisdiction over the person. See, e.g., Homburger, The 
Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 61 (1966); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended 
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533. 
327 
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The impact of the commercial jurisdictional cases can be significant for 
businesses engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. For example, the 
products liability exposure of foreign manufacturers is substantial where 
manufacturers' products enter the stream of world commerce and eventually 
end up causing injury in the United States. Foreign manufacturers who 
cultivate the U.S. market by selling directly to the United States, or who do 
so indirectly through subsidiaries or distributors, are clearly on notice that 
they need to evaluate their potential tort liability exposure in the U.S. 
market and to plan accordingly. The problem, however, is different for those 
businesses who neither deal directly with the United States nor endeavor to 
cultivate the U.S. market, but whose products end up in the United States 
and allegedly cause injury there. Despite the absence of affiliating contacts 
with the United States, some businesses may still risk being subject to 
liability in any of the fifty states, each state having its own standard of 
liability for injury caused by allegedly defective or dangerous products. Risk 
planning for these businesses is a serious concern. Added costs reflected in 
the price of goods traded internationally are genuine. Whether such risk 
bearing and additional costs are justified is open to serious dispute. 
The nexus necessary for a court to properly assert personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign business, consistent with due process, remains unclear in 
Supreme Courtjurisprudence.7 Some lower court decisions on this question, 
however, indicate that the necessary nexus may be very thin indeed.8 In a 
recent decision, the California Supreme Court concluded that personal juris-
diction existed over a foreign manufacturer who had no direct dealings or 
~ies with California.9 More specifically, the court in Asahi Metal Industry 
Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court IO affirmed that California was justified in exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction in a products liability action over a Japanese com-
ponent parts manufacturer which had no direct contacts in California. 1 1 The 
court reasoned that since Asahi Metal Industry knew that a substantial 
number of its parts would be incorporated into finished products in Taiwan 
which would be eventually sold in the United States, a California court could 
constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the company.I2 The 
7 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. As used in this article, 
"foreign" corporation refers to an alien or foreign-country corporation, not a corpo-
ration incorporated in a sister state. 
S See, e.g., Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633 F.2d 155 
(9th Cir. 1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 
P.2d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986). 
But see Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 983 (1978). 
9 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 35, 702 P.2d at 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 385. 
10Id. 
11 Id. The facts of this case are also reported in the California court of appeals 
decision. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 30, 
withdrawn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 741, 743 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 19-28. 
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Asahi Metal decision stretches the limits of due process and portends seri-
ous adverse consequences for international trade. 
This article first examines Asahi Metal in light of recent Supreme Court 
case law on personal jurisdiction and concludes that the California Supreme 
Court's analysis fails to satisfy the criteria of the United States Supreme 
Court's recent decisions dealing with personal jurisdiction. The Asahi Metal 
decision is then analyzed from an international trade perspective. This 
section focuses on long-arm jurisdictional statutes like California's which 
may have the effect of a non-tariff barrier to trade when used to reach remote 
foreign manufacturers of component parts. The article proposes that Con-
gress enact legislation, pursuant to its commerce clause power, which (1) 
regulates personal jurisdiction by state courts over foreign corporations and 
other foreign business entities, and (2) adopts a national products liability 
law. Such legislation is necessary to alleviate the inevitable friction with 
U.S. trading partners which overly expansive jurisdictional cases such as 
Asahi Metal will undoubtedly create. 
II. A REVIEW OF THE Asahi Metal DECISION 
In 1978 the operator of a motorcycle was injured and his wife was killed 
when a tire on their motorcycle blew out while they were driving along a 
California freeway.13 Both the operator and his wife were California resi-
dents.14 The tire's tube was manufactured in Taiwan by Cheng Shin Rubber 
Industrial Co., Ltd. and incorporated a tube valve assembly manufactured by 
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., a Japanese manufacturer of tire valve as-
semblies.Is The operator of the motorcycle and his children brought suit 
against Cheng Shin and others,t6 but not against Asahi. More than two years 
after the action was instituted, Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint for in-
demnity against its co-defendants and against several new cross-defendants, 
including AsahiP Asahi moved to quash service of the summons on the 
cross-complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending that it lacked 
the requisite contacts with California to support an assertion of jurisdiction 
there. IS 
12 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 48-49, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 393. 
13 [d. at 40-41, 702 P.2d at 544, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Asahi Metal Industry Co., 
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742. 
14 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 41,702 P.2d at 544,216 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Asahi Metal 
Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742. 
IS Asalzi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 41,702 P.2d at 544,216 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Asahi Metal 
Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742. 
16 Also named as a defendant was the California retailer, Sterling May Co. Asahi 
Metal, 39 Cal. 3d. at 41, 702 P.2d at 544,216 Cal. Rptr. at 387; Asahi Metal Industry 
Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742. 
17 194 Cal. Rptr. at 742. Service of process was effected in Japan pursuant to 
treaty. [d. 
18 [d. 
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According to the uncontested evidence, Asahi did no business in Califor-
nia. 19 It had no property, office, agent or employees there.20 Asahi did not 
advertise, nor did it solicit business in California.21 In the ten-year period 
prior to the lawsuit, Asahi had sold tire valves to Cheng Shin for use on 
motorcycle tire tubes in Taiwan.22 All such sales occurred in Taiwan. Cheng 
Shin bought and incorporated 150,000 Asahi valve assemblies in 1978; 
500,000 in 1979; 500,000 in 1980; 100,000 in 1981; and 100,000 in 1982.23 Sales 
to Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi's gross income in 1981 
and 0.44 percent in 1982.24 Cheng Shin purchased valve assemblies from 
suppliers other than Asahi and sold tire tubes throughout the world, approx-
imately twenty percent of which went to the United States.2S Like Asahi, 
Cheng Shin was a nonresident manuacturer.26 Although Asahi's president 
stated that Asahi had never contemplated that its sales to Cheng Shin in 
Taiwan would subject it to jurisdiction in California,27 Cheng Shin's manager 
countered that in discussions with Asahi the fact had been mentioned that 
Cheng Shin sold tubes throughout the world, including the United States.28 
California's long-arm statute provides that its courts "may exercise juris-
diction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of 
the United States."29 Every case arising under that statute, therefore, as-
sumes constitutional dimensions under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. It was Asahi's contention that its connection with 
California did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over it by a California 
court, and therefore, was inconsistent with due process. The California 
Supreme Court rejected this contention,30 relying heavily on the United 
19 !d. at 743. 
20 !d. 
21 !d. 
22 [d. at 742. 
23 [d. 
24 [d. at 742-43. 
2S [d. at 743. 
26 [d. 
27 !d. 
28 !d. 
29 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Unlike most state long-arm statutes 
which list acts submitting one to jurisdiction within that state, see, e.g., FLA . STAT. 
ANN. § 48.193 (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 2.208 (Smith-Hurd 1983); 
N.Y. CIV. FMc. LAW § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1972). The California legislature took a 
flexible statutory approach which was easy to draft and which ensured that California 
would keep in step with all constitutional developments in the area of personal 
jurisdiction. As a consequence, however, ease of drafting and flexibility necessarily 
sacrificed predictability of application. See generally Secrest Machine Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 664,660 P.2d 399,190 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1983); Cornelison v. 
Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976). 
30 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 47-48, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392~!)3. 
HeinOnline -- 4 B.U. Int’l L. J. 331 1986
1986] ASAHI METAL INDUSTRY CO., LTD. V. SUPERIOR COURT 331 
States Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson. 31 
The issue as framed by the California Supreme Court was whether "Cali-
fornia [could] constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a manufac-
turer of component parts who made no direct sales in California but had 
knowledge that a subst~tial number of its parts would be incorporated into 
finished products sold in the state. . .. "32 The court began its analysis by 
tracing the history of the International Shoe minimum contacts standard33 
from the first of its progeny, McGee v. International Life Insurance CO.,34 
through Hanson v. Denckla3s and Shaffer v. Heitner,36 and ultimately to 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.37 The court placed greatest 
reliance on the World-Wide Volkswagen decision.38 
Chief Justice Bird, speaking for the California Supreme Court, viewed 
World-Wide Volkswagen as essentially a stream-of-commerce theory deci-
sion.39 Under that theory, "[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers 
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the 
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State."40 
The United States Supreme Court's rationale for allowing personaljurisdic-
tion to be asserted over such a defendant is that when a defendant's conduct 
is such that the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting business in the forum state, it is thereby on notice that it is 
subject to suit in that state.41 With that notice, a business can purchase 
insurance, pass the costs of doing business on to customers, or withdraw 
from the forum state altogether.42 
Chief Justice Bird noted that each party to the dispute relied on World-
31 444 U.S. at 286. 
32 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 40, 702 P.2d at 544, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. 
33 [d. at 42-43, 702 P.2d at 545-46, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88. 
34 355 U.S. at 220. 
3S 357 U.S. at 235. 
36 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
37 444 U.S. at 286. 
38 Asalzi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 43-45, 702 P.2d at 546-48, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 388-90. 
39 [d. at 46, 702 P.2d at 548, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91. 
40 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. See Seidelson, Recasting 
World-Wide Volkswagen As A Source of Longer Jurisdictional Reach, 19 TULSA 
L.J. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Seidelsonl; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. 
Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 783 (1981); 
Note, Foreign Defendants and Their Defective Products: An Application of World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1981); Note, 
Constitutional Law-ln Personam Jurisdiction: Federalism and Fairness as Func-
tions of Minimum Contacts-A Conceptual Failure, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 796 (1980). 
41 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
42 [d. 
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Wide Volkswagen to support its respective positions,43 but found Asahi's 
reliance misplaced.44 Asahi's valve assembly was sold in the forum state as 
part of a finished product, thus reaching California in the stream of com-
merce.45 More importantly, Asahi not only engaged in substantial business 
in California, in Justice Bird's opinion, but did so with the expectation that 
its products would be sold in the state.46 Although Asahi -had not actively 
attempted to exploit the forum's market, the court deemed mere knowledge 
of the distribution system enough to satisfy the expectation requirement. 47 
Citing in support several component part manufacturer cases,48 the court 
found that the minimum contacts requirement had been met where the 
manufacturer is aware that a substantial number of its products will be sold 
in the forum state:19 
Having cleared the minimum contacts hurdle, Chief Justice Bird next 
determined another due process question: whether the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.50 Even 
though the plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed with prejudice, presum-
ably pursuant to a settlement,51 the court rejected Asahi's contention that 
California had no interest in adjudicating an indemnity dispute between two 
foreign manufacturers. 52 The court instead found three considerations favor-
ing the exercise of jurisdiction: California's interest in protecting its con-
sumers, the interest in orderly administration of the laws since most of the 
evidence was in California, and the avoidance of inconsistent results given 
that Cheng Shin had named numerous defendants in its cross-complaint.53 
Even though the plaintiffs' complaint had been dismissed, the court stated 
that California had a continuing interest in the litigation to determine how 
43 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 47, 702 P.2d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. 
46 [d. at 48, 702 P.2d at 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
47 !d. at 49, 702 P.2d at 550-51,216 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court found support for 
this conclusion in Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1126 n.7 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
48 In addition to the Nelson by Carson case, supra note 47, the court also cited in 
support Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche, 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980). 
Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 51, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394. 
49 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 50, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394. 
50 [d. The court expressed doubt as to the continuing relevance of the fairness 
determination in light of the World-Wide Volkswagen decision's heavy emphasis on 
forum contacts. 39 Cal. 3d at 52 n.8, 702 P.2d at 552 n.8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394 n.8. 
51 !d. at 52 n.9, 702 P.2d at 552 n.9, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.9. See THE ECONOMIST, 
May 3, 1986, at 34, col. 2. 
,52 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 52, 702 P.2d at 552, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395. 
53 !d. 
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liability would be apportioned.54 The court concluded that the inconveni-
ence to Asahi of defending itself in a foreign country was not outweighed by 
California's interest in asserting jurisdiction.55 
III. CAN KNOWLEDGE OF A MARKET ALONE SATISFY DUE PROCESS? 
The crux of the court's decision in Asahi Metal is that Asahi arguably 
knew that Cheng Shin sold tire tubes in the U.S. market which incorporated 
Asahi's valves. Consequently, Asahi could have reasonably anticipated 
being haled into court in the United States.S6 Did Asahiknow, however, that 
its goods were being sold specifically in California, or did it know only 
generally that a portion of its valve sales to Cheng Shin reached the U.S. 
market? If not, could knowledge of sales in the United States then be 
imputed? Is such knowledge the equivalent of purposefully availing oneself 
of the benefits and privileges of the forum state's laws,57 thereby subjecting 
oneself to jurisdiction in that forum? What if Asahi had made a conscious 
and successful effort to remain ignorant of Chen Shin's distribution chain? 
Would affirmative answers to any of these questions lead to a different 
result? 
As a threshold consideration, the California Supreme Court did not iden-
tify a single instance of knowledge on Asahi's part that its valves were 
destined for California as opposed to the U.S. market as a whole. The court 
did not cite any facts tending to show that Asahi had attempted to cultivate a 
market for its goods within California (or the United States as a whole).5s 
Given these considerations, can it be said that Asahi could have reasonably 
foreseen the possibility of litigation in California, as the term "reasonably 
foreseen" is understood in the context of the "purposeful availment" re-
quirement of Hanson v. Denckla?59 Although Asahi's contacts in the United 
States, if aggregated, might arguably have afforded an adequate basis for 
54 !d. at 53 n.10, 702 P.2d at 553 n.10, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.10. 
55 [d. Notwithstanding the court's reservations concerning the continued impor-
tance of the reasonableness/fairness criterion in personal jurisdiction evaluations, 
("[i]n light of the heavy emphasis on defendant-forum contacts in World-Wide 
Volkswagen, the continuing relevance of the fairness determination is unclear"), id. 
at 52 n.8, 702 P.2d at 552 n.8, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 394 n.8. little doubt on that score can 
remain after the Supreme Court's most recent decision on personal jurisdiction in 
Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184-85 (1985). 
56 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 48, 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
57 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. 
58 See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290,298 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, _ U.S. _,106 S. Ct. 383 (1986); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and 
Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 124-25 & n.147 (1983) [hereinafter Lilly], 
where the author notes that in the vast majority of cases, an alien must have sufficient 
contacts with a particular state. 
S9 357 U.S. at 253. 
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personal jurisdiction in federal court under a national contacts theory ,60 
nothing in the Asahi Metal opinion indicated that Asahi had purposefully 
availed itself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state in the sense of 
attempting to cultivate a market for its goods in either the state of California 
or the United States as a whole.61 
The import of the Supreme Court's guidelines is that some showing must 
be made that a defendant, such as Asahi, "purposefully directed" its ac-
tivities at residents of the forum. 62 In the Supreme Court's most recent 
decision on personal jurisdiction, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,63 the 
Court reaffirmed its line of decisions on personal jurisdiction64 and stressed 
that the '''purposeful availment' requirement [first announced in Hanson v. 
Denckla] ensures that a defendant will not be haled into ajurisdiction solely 
as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitious,' or 'attenuated' contacts, ... or of the 
'unilateral activity of another party or a third person .... "'65 As the Court 
cautioned in World-Wide Volkswagen, "[i]f foreseeability were the crite-
rion, . . . [e ]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his 
agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the 
chattel. "66 The inquiry is thus one of the relationship among the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation,67 to the end of restricting state power.68 "[T]he 
60 See Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.O. Mich. 1973); First 
Flight Co. v. Nat'l Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 738 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). 
Contra DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 
654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). See generally Lilly, supra 
note 58, at 127-29, for a discussion of the national contacts theory of federal court 
jurisdiction. 
61 Compare Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 298 n.ll. 
62 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). 
63 105 S. Ct. at 2174. 
64 /d. at 2183. 
6S Id. (citations omitted). 
66 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296. Despite this seeming caveat by the 
Court against a sweeping assertion of jurisdiction by state courts, as one commen-
tator has observed, "[t]he case law ... has almost uniformly sustained the assertion 
of state court jurisdiction over the foreign-country defendant, especially the foreign 
manufacturer in products liability suits." Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign-
COllntry Corporate Defendants--Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 
431, 434 (1984). 
67 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). See also Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). 
68 As noted by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, "the Due Process 
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest 
the State of its power to render a valid judgement." 444 U.S. at 294. But see Burger 
King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2182 n.13 ("Although this protection [of minimum contacts] 
operates to restrict state power, it 'must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause' rather than as a 
function 'of federalism concerns.' "). 
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foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likeli-
hood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that 
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that 
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."69 
While modern transportation and communication have made it less bur-
densome to defend in a distant forum,'o the expansion of interstate and 
foreign commerce "has hardly dictated the abandonment of all limits on 
personal jurisdiction."71 The California Supreme Court did not base its 
decision on any showing of such "purposeful availment" or "purposeful 
direction" by Asahi vis-a.-vis the state of California. If principles of 
federalism and the orderly administration of the laws in a federal system are 
indeed the overarching considerations,72 then it is far from clear that the 
California state courts properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Asahi. 
Conceding Asahi's knowledge of Cheng Shin's distribution chain, can it be 
said that Asahi's contacts with the United States were anything more than 
attenuated? And if not attenuated, were those contacts with the United 
States merely the result of a third party's unilateral activity? Nothing in the 
record indicated that Asahi and Cheng Shin acted in concert in marketing the 
former's valves and the latter's tire tubes. On the contrary, from the record 
as disclosed by the California Supreme Court, Cheng Shin informed Asahi of 
its U.S. market gratuitously. If there was any business or other economic 
justification for that disclosure, the California Supreme Court did not say 
what it was, let alone whether it was of constitutional significance. 
Sensitivity to federalism concerns should be especially high when analyz-
ing the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer. This, 
however, is not the only consideration. The decision to exercise jurisdiction 
over a foreign component parts manufacturer can also have tremendous 
influence on foreign trade and the U.S. economy,'4 as well as in the interest 
of international comity. The next part of this article examines the interna-
tional trade ramifications of the Asahi Metal decision. 
69 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). See Seidelson, 
supra note 40, at 18, where the author observes that "World-Wide Volkswagen's 
primary rationale [was that] the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause is intended to protect the 
nonresident defendant from jurisdictional surprise." 
70 Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2183. 
71 Chung v. NANA Development Corp., 783 F.2d 1124, 1126 (4th Cir. 1986). 
72 Computer World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-94, with Burger King 
Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2182 n.13. 
73 See, e.g., Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A., 707 F.2d 395, 398 
(9th Cir. 1983) ("Normally, a court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction when 
another state has expressed a substantially stronger sovereignty interest ... "); 
Rocke v. Canadian Auto. Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395,399 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Where the 
defendant is a resident of a foreign nation rather than a resident of another state 
within our federal system, the sovereignty barrier is 'higher.' "). 
74 See Terez, The Misguided Helicopteros Case: Confusion in the Courts Over 
Comacts, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 913, 929 n.82 (1985) [hereinafter Terez]. 
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IV. LONG-ARM STATUTES AS A NON-TARIFF BARRIER TO TRADE 
The reach of a state's long-arm statute is virtually unbounded under the 
California Supreme Court's analysis in Asahi Metal. Simply knowing that 
its products may eventually end up in the United States subjects a remote 
foreign manufacturer or seller to the potential jurisdiction of any state court 
within the United States for products liability. The standard for allowing a 
state to hale a foreign corporation into its courts should be premised on 
factors more substantial and concrete than mere knowledge of the distribu-
tion system of which the manufacturer's products are an indirect part. Under 
the court's analysis in Asahi Metal, if the critical factor is mere knowledge or 
awareness of the chain of distribution, manufacturers would be penalized for 
making the effort to acquire complete information of the markets in which 
they deal directly or even indirectly. Ignorance of those markets would, 
conversely, be rewarded. Moreover, if knowledge of the distribution chain 
were to be imputed, the requirement of "purposeful availment" would be 
rendered virtually meaningless, since few, if any, instances exist where it 
could not be found that a component parts manufacturer lacked such knowl-
edge. Imputing knowledge could lead to a per se rule of personal jurisdiction 
over foreign component parts manufacturers whose goods are incorporated 
into products which enter the United States and subsequently cause injury. 
The exercise of jurisdiction over a remote foreign component parts man-
ufacturer7S in a products liability suit is effectively tantamount to an indirect 
administrative non-tariff barrier comparable to health and safety regulations 
or environmental controls. Such regulations and controls are implemented 
nominally to achieve some positive domestic policy, like clean air and clean 
water, but in the process have the negative effect of impairing trade.76 One 
author has suggested that these administrative and technical barriers to trade 
have a greater impact on international trade than either subsidies or 
quotas.77 For example, since health and safety regulations differ from coun-
try to country, they either make trade in certain goods impracticable or 
reduce the volume of trade. 78 Such regulations may serve salutary purposes 
and are not to be condemned wholesale.79 Nominal health and safety regula-
tions, however, may be used deliberately to raise costs of foreign manufac-
turers and thereby distort trade flows. 80 
7S As used in this context, "remote" means that the manufacturer did not intro-
duce its product directly into the United States or indirectly through a subsidiary or 
distributor who acts as a go-between. 
76 See D. GREENAWAY, TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM 132 
(1983). 
77 Id. at 148. 
78Id. 
79 For example, trade in live animals is usually subject to tight controls in order to 
contain the spread of communicable diseases. !d. at 148. 
8°Id. 
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When trading with the United States, a foreign manufacturer is confronted 
with the daunting prospect of meeting the health and safety laws and regula-
tions of some fifty states plus the federal government. As part of the Tokyo 
Round of Trade Negotiations concluded in 1979 under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),81 the contracting par-
ties to GATT concluded the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.82 
That Agreement was designed to ensure "that technical regulations and 
standards [regarding health and safety, for example] are not prepared, 
adopted, or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international 
trade. "83 In addition, national governments made a commitment "to take 
such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local 
government bodies within their territories comply with the provisions 01;' 
Article 2. . . .' '84 
Exercising jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer in a products liability 
action does not, strictly speaking, constitute a technical regulation within the 
contemplation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.8s How-
ever, the exercise of such jurisdiction is a means to the enforcement of state 
products liability laws. These laws are grounded on the protection of con-
sumers, a matter that is contemplated by the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.86 In Title IV of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,87 
81 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). 
82 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, done at Geneva, April 12, 1979 (entered into 
force, Jan. 1, 1980). The implementing legislation is contained at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2531-
73 (1982). Two GATT articles are also relevant in this connection: article III, the 
national treatment provision of GATT; and article XX, the health and welfare 
exception. The term "national treatment" as used in GATT means that "imported 
goods will be accorded the same treatment as goods of local origin with respect to 
matters under government control, such as taxation and regulation." J. JACKSON, 
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 273 (1969). Article XX contains a list of 
exceptions to the GATT obligations and provides in part: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... 
See JACKSON, supra this note, at 742-45. 
83 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 82, art. 2.1. 
84 [d., art. 3.1. 
8S See, e.g., section 401 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2532, 
which permits the states to adopt health and safety regulations and other laws to 
protect consumer interests. 
86 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 2531 (1979). 
87 Pub. L. No. 96-39; 93 Stat. 243 (1979). 
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Congress made it clear that "no State agency . . . should engage in any 
standards-related activity that creates unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. "88 "Standards-related activity" and "State 
agency" are defined broadly enough to encompass state court civil enforce-
ment of a state's products liability laws. 89 
For a remote component parts manufacturer, such standards-related activ-
ity may create an unnecessary obstacle to trading with the United States. 
Although the states may have a legitimate interest in protecting its residents 
from defective product injuries, that interest is adequately protected by 
allowing actions against the immediate seller or manufacturer-assembler.90 
Such liability will induce care on the part of the seller of the finished product 
in selecting its parts suppliers. A strict liability standard will relieve the 
injured party from the burden of proving where in the marketing chain a 
defect originated.91 Even when liability is based on negligence, a business 
which labels a product as its own is treated the same as if it had manufac-
tured the product. 92 Again, victims are relieved of the burden of suing all the 
potentially numerous component parts manufacturers whose parts went into 
the finished product. Tort law has sufficiently advanced such that the state's 
interests in protecting its residents from defective products is fully served 
without the need for drawing into the litigation all of the remote parts 
manufacturers from around the world. 
From a practical standpoint, component parts manufacturers cannot con-
trol the flow of their products once they enter the stream of commerce. To 
subject such manufacturers to products liability in a forum with which they 
have had no direct contact erects a barrier to international trade as insidious 
as any tariff or quota. Unlike tariffs and quotas, there is no standard regula-
tion, and the visibility of such a barrier is extremely low. Presently, it is 
extremely difficult to predict with any degree of certainty when or to what 
88 19 U.S.C. § 2533(a) (1979). The term "State agency" is defined as "any de-
partment, agency, or other instrumentality of the government of any State or of 
any political subdivision of any State." Id. § 2571(16) (1979). The term "stan-
dard" is defined in part as "[t]he specification of the characteristics of a product, 
including, but not limited to, levels of quality, performance, safety, or dimensions." 
/d. § 2571(13)(A) (1971). The term "standards-related activity", in turn, is defined as 
"the development, adoption, or application of any standard or any certification 
system." /d. § 2571(14) (1971). 
89 See id. §§ 2533(a); 2571(13)(A), (14), (16). 
90 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
703-07 (1984). See also Hutson v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1978), cerro 
denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978), where the court rejected the argument that the forum had 
jurisdiction over a remote seller, noting that the plaintiffs in that case could sue the 
packager, distributor, and retailer of the allegedly defective product. Id. at 837 n.l. 
91 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 90, at 706. 
92 /d. at 704-05. 
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extent a remote foreign seller of a component part, with no perceivable 
contacts with the forum, will find itself subject to suit for products liability. 
As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, the minimum contacts analysis 
is qualitative, not quantitative or mechanical,93 necessarily precluding any 
accurate predictions as to the likelihood of being subject to suit in a United 
States forum. 
The potential exposure, on the other hand, can be extraordinarily high, 
particularly in the case of a wrongful death action. Even when a foreign 
component parts manufacturer sells its products directly to the United 
States, the disparity in products liability laws among the fifty states,94 
coupled with the vagaries of jury awards, injects an element of business 
uncertainty sufficiently great that the U.S. market to foreign manufacturers 
can be effectively closed. As the next section discusses, the need for a 
multi-faceted legislative and judicial response is imperative. 
The assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances may represent, in 
effect, a non-tariff barrier to international trade.95 Not only is this result 
wholly untenable for foreign businesses, it should raise concerns within 
Congress as well. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution commits to 
Congress the power to regulate trade with foreign nations.96 In this connec-
tion the exercise of state court jurisdiction has been measured not only 
against the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also 
against the Commerce Clause.97 One rationale for restricting the exercise of 
93 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 92; Shafferv. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 
203-04. 
94 See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A 
Rush to Judgmellt, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221 (1978-79); Epstein, Products Liability: The 
Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Design 
Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1976); Green, Strict Liability 
Under Sections402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1976). 
9S See generally Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implemellting the Tokyo Round: 
Legal Aspects of Changing Illternational Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267, 
357-83 (1982). (Non-tariff barriers to trade include quantitative restrictions on im-
ports to the United States, voluntary restraint agreements, export and domestic 
subsidies, health and safety regulations, and customs valuation procedures). See R. 
FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
433-94 (1986); Greenaway, supra note 76, at 132. 
96 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cls. 1 & 3. See United States v. Yoshida Int'!, Inc., 526 
F.2d 560, 571 (C.C.P.A. 1975); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 
658 (4th Cir. 1953), afI'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) ("the power to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce ... is expressly vested by the Constitution 
in the Congress."). 
97 See, e.g., Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Erlanger 
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Bryson v. 
Northlake Hilton, 407 F. Supp. 73, 78 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Klepper v. Canadian Pac. 
Ry. Co., 271 App. Div. 52, 62 N.Y. Supp. 2d 627 (1946). In United Barge Co. v. 
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state court jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause includes the burden of 
defending in remote jurisdictions , which impairs efficiency of operations and 
adds commensurate expense.98 In one case, for example, the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant was found to constitute 
an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce where the defendant 
had no offices or employees in the forum state but merely solicited business 
there. 99 Although other courts have implicitly acknowledged the soundness 
of the burden-on-commerce argument, they have nevertheless concluded on 
the facts of the particular case that commerce was not unduly burdened by 
the exercise of jurisdiction in the forum.loo 
Despite the promise of the Commerce Clause as ajurisdictional shield for 
foreign component parts manufacturers, the additional limitation placed on 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commerce Clause, as observed by some 
commentators, has not developed substantially.lol One explanation for why 
the Commerce Clause has atrophied as a control over the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction is that the commerce clause limitation on state court 
jurisdiction is superfluous given "the recent revival offederalism constraints 
in the Volkswagen case .... "102 The World-Wide Volkswagen case, in the 
view of Professors Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, raised the threshold for 
assertions of state jurisdiction and injected "some predictability and cer-
tainty into a test that is the source of so much litigation."103 If the World-
Wide Volkswagen decision raised such a threshold under the Due Process 
Clause, it must have been a very low one given the apparent ease with which 
the Asahi Metal court stepped over it. A revival of the commerce clause 
limitation may, therefore, be essential, at least insofar as ensuring that the 
Logan Charter Service, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624 (D. Minn. 1964), the court observed 
that "[w]ith the recent expansion of the power of the States to exercise personal 
jurisdiction under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, we would expect a concurrent easing 
of the restrictions under interstate commerce tests." /d. at 630 n.lS. 
98 See Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. at 31S. 
99 Bryson v. Northlake Hilton, 407 F. Supp. at 78. 
100 See, e.g., United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Service, Inc., 237 F. Supp. at 
630; Wahl v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964). 
101 J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 139 (198S); R. 
FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 824 (Sth ed. 1984) ("the [C]ommerce [C]lause has only very rarely been 
invoked for such purpose, and its continuing vitality as an independent limitation on a 
state's exercise of judicial authority is somewhat in doubt."). See Comment, Con-
stitutional Limitations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. IS6, 
173-80 (1982), for a discussion of the Commerce Clause as a limitation on jurisdic-
tion. 
102 FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 101, at 139. 
103 /d. at 138. 
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free flow of international trade is not curtailed consistent with domestic 
health and safety considerations.104 
V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO Asahi Metal 
One legislative step by Congress in response to expansive jurisdictional 
cases such as Asahi Metal would be enactment of a statute pursuant to its 
commerce clause power regulating personal jurisdiction over foreign-
country manufacturers whose goods enter the United States and thereafter 
give rise to alleged products liability .10S One proposal would be enactment of 
a jurisdictional statute subjecting foreign manufacturers or distributors of 
allegedly defective products to personal jurisdiction in the United States 
only if they were doing business in the United States within the meaning of 
28 U .S.C. § 1391 (c ).106 In effect, jurisdiction over foreign parts manufactur-
104 See Note, International Products Liability and Long-Arm Jurisdiction: Hutson 
v. Fehr Bros., Inc., 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, 322 (1980) [hereinafter 
International Products Liability], where the author suggests that where interna-
tional defendants are involved, the courts should return to the" traditional jurisdic-
tional standards applicable between sovereigns and find jurisdiction "only when the 
forum has a more traditional 'power' to support jurisdiction over the defendant ... 
[in the form of] substantial contacts .... " 
105 While many statutory provisions currently exist conferring jurisdiction upon 
the U.S. Court ofInternational Trade in matters involving international trade, see 28 
U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(i) (1980) and § 1582 (1948), those provisions are essentially in rem, 
affecting only the imported merchandise, not in personam on the foreign manufac-
turer or producer. See generally Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the U.S. Court of 
International Trade, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 13 (1985). One exception is civil penalty 
actions under 19 U .S.C. § 1592 (1982). In addition, those jurisdictional statutes do 
not confer power upon the Court ofInternational Trade to hear cases involving injury 
to persons resulting from imported products. 
In addition, section 1.03(a)(4) of the Uniform Interstate and International Proce-
dure Act, 13 U .L.A. 459 (1980), provides for jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer 
who causes tortious injury within the state by an act or omission outside that state 
only if that defendant "regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other 
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered, in this state." Unif. Interstate and In1'l Procedure 
Act § 1.03(a)(4) (1980). See Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-Sovereign 
Defendant, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 431 (1982), where the author notes: "The flaw in 
this provision [section 1.03(a)(4)] is that it draws no distinction between the defen-
dant who ships the product directly into the forum or sells to a distributor for forum 
sale and a defendant who does not expect its product to reach the forum in the 
ordinary course of commercial distribution." Id. at 435. See generally Cohen, In 
Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Courts Over Foreign Corporations: The Needfor a 
Federal Long-Arm Statute, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 59 (1985). 
106 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948) provides: 
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or 
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be 
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes. 
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ers would be synonymous with the "doing business" venue provision for 
corporations contained in title 28, United States Code. 
The quantum of contacts needed to establish "doing business" venue 
under section 1391(c) have generally been found by the courts to exceed the 
International Shoe minimum contacts needed for personal jurisdiction. 107 
However, as Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper point out, "[u]nfortu-
nately the cases espousing this view give very little indication of how much 
more is required."108 One well-articulated test of "doing business" devel-
oped in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,109 and adopted by the First 
Circuit in slightly modified form,11° requires that the corporate defendant be 
engaged in sufficiently extensive activities within the forum state to the 
effect that it should be able to obtain a license to do business there. lll As 
formulated by the First Circuit in Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool 
Master, Inc., 112 a corporation is "doing business" under section 1391(c), "if 
107 See, e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (1st 
Cir. 1984); J.L. Clark Mfg. Co. v. Gold Bond Corp., 629 F. Supp. 788, 789 (E.D. Pa 
1985); Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 889-90 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184,189 
(D. Del. 1974). See generally Lansing & Castle, Venue in the Federal Courts Under 
the "Doing Business" Provision of28 U.S.C. 1391(c): A Provision Subject to Rein-
terpretation? 16 U. RICH. L. REv. 7 (1981); Note, Federal Venue Over Corporations 
Under Section 1391(c): PlaillliffCorporations, The Judicial District Limitation, and 
"Doing Business," 12 GA. L. REv. 295 (1978). 
108 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3811, at 118-19 (1985). See Note, supra note 107, at 309, where the author notes 
that "most of the cases that have differentiated between 'transacting business' for 
personal jurisdiction and 'doing business' for federal venue have failed to provide 
ascertainable guidelines for determining what criteria will, in fact, constitute 'doing 
business' under section 1391 (c). " 
- 109 See, e.g., Smith v. Avco-Lycoming, 497 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Damon 
Coats, Inc. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Trinity Metals 
v. Andy Int'l, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Fox-Keller, Inc. v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Remington Rand, Inc. v. 
Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1956). 
110 Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 947. 
111 See supra note 109 and cases cited therein. In Remington Rand, 139 F. Supp. 
at 613, the court concluded that a corporation is "doing business" for purposes of 
section 1391(c) if its activities within the district are such that "some state would 
probably" require the foreign corporation to be licensed as a condition precedent to 
doing that volume of business within its borders. !d. at 620-21. 
112 743 F.2d at 947. The Johnson Creative Arts court in essence agreed with the 
district court's test in Remington Rand, supra notes 109, 111, "to the extent tha~ it 
stands for the proposition that 'doing business' as used in the federal venue statute 
requires some kind of localization of the corporation." 743 F.2d at 954. 
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it is doing such business there that the state in which the district is located 
would require the corporation to obtain a license or register."113 
In the Johnson Creative Arts decision the court rejected the argument that 
"the test for 'doing business' under the venue statute should be the same as 
the test for determining whether a corporation is amenable to service of 
process."114 The argument essentially was that the minimum,quantum of 
contacts necessary to satisfy the due process "fairness" requirement should 
equally suffice to meet the "doing business" test of section 1391(c). The 
First Circuit noted that such an equation was misguided because "[v]enue 
limitations generally are added by Congress to insure a defendant a fair 
location for trial and to protect him from inconvenient litigation,"1l5 
whereas "[t]he minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction is based on 
the minimum amount of 'fairness' required in order to comport with due 
process."1l6 Thus, more forum contacts are required to satisfy the "doing 
business" test under section 1391(c) than are necessary to meet the mini-
mum contacts test of International Shoe and its progeny.117 Conversely, if 
the "doing business" test under section 1391(c) is satisfied, then Interna-
tional Shoe minimum contacts would exist ipso facto, provided the claim 
which was the subject of the particular lawsuit related to the defendant's 
business activities in the forum. 
The proposed legislation would raise the level of minimum contacts for 
jurisdictional purposes by measuring them against the "doing business" test 
of section 1391(c) as formulated by the First Circuit in Johnson Creative 
Arts. If adopted, this proposal would inject a certain quantitative element 
into the contacts analysis, but would still preserve the qualitative nature of 
the contacts inquiry as formulated by the Supreme Court. I IS In short, unless 
the quantum of contacts necessary to meet section 1391(c)'s "doing busi-
ness" criterion were met-that is, unless a state could require the foreign 
corporation to obtain a license or register-then a state could not exercise 
jurisdiction over it. Under this jurisdictional standard, the Commerce Clause 
would become the source for determining whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over an alien corporation is proper, not the Due Process Clause.1l9 In 
1\3 Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 954. 
114 Id. at 949. The court acknowledged the contrary views on this point held by 
Professor Moore "that if a corporation is amenable to service of process it should be 
held to be 'doing business' for venue purposes." !d. (quoting from 1 J. MOORE, 
W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 110.142, at 1411). 
115 Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 949. 
116 Id. (emphasis in original). 
117 See, e.g., J.L. Clark Mfg., Co., 629 F. Supp. at 789. 
118 See supra note 93. 
119 Cf, Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 954 (state licensing requirements of 
corporations are subject to the Commerce Clause); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & 
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3811, at 121 (1985). 
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the First Circuit's view, "uniformity will be achieved if' doing business' . . . 
mean[s] engaging in transactions [in the district] to such an extent and of 
such a nature that the state in which the district is located could require the 
foreign corporation to qualify to 'do business' there."12o 
Although the issue of whether a corporation is "doing business" is a 
factual question,121 the Commerce Clause places a limitation upon when a 
state may require a foreign corporation to obtain a license to do business in 
that state.122 For example, a state may not require a foreign corporation to 
qualify to do business absent some intrastate activity or localization of the 
business in that state.123 In addition, more than a single transaction or casual 
activity within the state is required before a corporation may be regarded as 
doing business there. 124 A statutory requirement that jurisdiction may be 
asserted over an alien corporation in a products liability action only if it is 
"doing business" in the forum within the meaning of section 1391(c) would 
only slightly break with prior Supreme Court cases which have focused on 
the quality offorum contacts. 125 Although greater stress would be placed on 
120 Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 954 (emphasis in original; footnote omit-
ted). 
121 See, e.g., Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionary Union, 565 F. Supp. 
286, 290 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The court in Flowers Industries explained: 
There is no exact formula under which the question can be decided. To reach the 
proper answer, consideration must be given to such relevant factors as the 
general character of the corporation, the nature and scope of its business opera-
tions, the extent of the authorized corporate activities conducted on its behalf 
within the forum district, the continuity of those activities, and its contacts 
within the district. A corporation is present within the forum district when its 
activities there have not only been continuous and systematic but also give rise 
to the liability sued OIl, even though no consent to be sued or authorization of an 
agent to accept service of process has been given. 
!d. at 290. 
122 AIlenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1974); Dahnke-Walker 
Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). Although the Commerce Clause "is 
not as directly concerned as the Due Process provision is with 'fairness,' ... [t]he 
Commerce Clause limitation on licensing requirements is used as the test for 'doing 
business' ... because it sets the minimum amount of activity necessary to require a 
corporation to obtain a license from a particular state." Johnson Creative Arts, 743 
F.2d at 954 n. 11. 
123 Allenberg Cotton Co., 419 U.S. at 33. InAllenberg Cotton, the Court rejected a 
state court finding that a corporation was "doing business" in Mississippi when it had 
no offices or warehouses there, when no employees solicited business or worked 
there on a regular basis, and when the transactions which were the subject of the 
lawsuit were in the stream of interstate commerce and conducted primarily through 
themail.Id.at 33. 
124 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3811, at 123 (1985). For a comparison of cases holding on particular facts that a 
corporation was or was not "doing business" within a district, see id. at 126-31. 
125 See supra note 93. 
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the quantity of those contacts,126 the nature of those contacts would remain 
important. 127 
As a corollary to this legislative proposal, national products liability legis-
lation is needed to create a uniform standard for products liability through-
out the United States. Presently, foreign manufacturers-not to mention 
, domestic manufacturers-must run a gauntlet of fifty state product liability 
laws.128 Of course, it will always be arguable that this is the price of doing 
business with a nation such as the United States or The Federal Republic of 
West Germany. It is impossible, however, to rationally plan for liability 
contingencies when the possibility exists of being subject to suit in a state 
with which the foreign manufacturer does not directly deal. The current 
product liability laws, coupled with jury awards which may at times appear 
arbitrary, can only have the effect of burdening international trade. A legisla-
tive response by Congress is clearly needed. While Congress and the Com-
merce Department have initiated proposals for enactment of national prod-
ucts liability legislation,129 those efforts have failed to date.130 
In the absence of a congressional response, the Supreme Court could fine 
tune its "purposeful availment" requirement first announced in Hanson v. 
DenckLa. A refinement of the "purposeful availment" requirement would 
incorporate the Supreme Court's injunction against extending personal 
jurisdiction in cases where the defendant's acts are fortuitous, random, or 
attenuated, or where the effects are the result of the unilateral activity of a 
third person. At the same time, the reach of long-arm statutes would not 
extend worldwide. Liability would be premised on ajoint enterprise theory. 
Under this theory, a foreign component parts manufacturer whose prod-
ucts entered the United States indirectly through some unrelated distributor 
or manufacturer would not be subject to jurisdiction-in the absence of other 
forum contacts-unless it could be established that a community of interest 
and common purpose in selling to the U.S. market existed between the 
126 See, e.g., J.L. Clark Mfg. Co., 629 F. Supp. at 789. 
127 See Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 954. 
128 Of course, the standards for products liability are the same or similar among 
many of the states. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 90, at §§ 95-104. 
129 See S.44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S.2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); 
Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979); Cohen, 
Analysis of the Products Liability Act (S.44, 98th Congress), reprinted in 3 J. 
PROD. LIAB. 1 (1984); Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search for 
the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REv. 411 (1982). For a critical analysis 
of the Uniform Product Liability Law, see Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the 
Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221 
(1978-79). 
130 The Reagan administration has proposed similar federal legislation which 
would, inter alia, place a cap on product liability damage awards. See Chris. Sci. 
Mon., May 2, 1986, at 5. 
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component parts manufacturer and the finished goods manufacturer or dis-
tributor. While such a relationship could be established by contract or 
imputed by course of dealings, the critical inquiry under a joint enterprise 
theory would be whether the component parts manufacturer, in collabora-
tion with the finished goods manufacturer or distributor, attempted to culti-
vate a market for its goods within the forum state. 131 Trading in the U.S. 
market would have to be more than merely incidental to the arrangement. 132 
As the Supreme Court observed in World- Wide Volkswagen, "the foreseea-
bility that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a 
product will find its way into the forum State." 133 The mere likelihood that a 
product will enter the forum state is a constitutionally insufficient forum 
contact. 134 
Under a joint enterprise theory, potential products liability plaintiffs 
would not be without a basis for recovery since they could still sue the 
distributor, ultimate manufacturer-assembler, or retailer either under a tort 
or breach of warranty theory .135 Such an approach to the problem of per-
sonal jurisdiction would be consonant with the "highly realistic" approach 
which the Supreme Court identified as preferable to mechanical or talis-
manic analyses .136 By requiring a more substantive showing of forum con-
131 See Max Daetll'yler Corp., 762 F.2d at 298 n.ll, where the court notes that 
"World-Wide Volkswagen . .. may thus be read to suggest that a defendant manufac-
turer need not have transacted business in the forum state if it has attempted to 
cultivate a market for its goods within the state. The requirement that a foreign 
manufacturer attempt to develop a market, however, must subsume those purposeful 
affiliation requirements, beyond mere foreseeability .... " See also Seidelson, supra 
note 40, at 24 (marketing activities within the forum are of constitutional sig-
nificance). Such a requirement would also help ensure against forum shopping. If 
foreign manufacturers sell in the United States as a single distribution market, they 
would be amenable to suit in anyone of the 50 states under the Asahi Metal court's 
analysis, regardless of whether the claim was related to the forum. See generally 
Terez, supra note 74, at 930. 
132 See, e.g., Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronum, 629 F. Supp. 903, 908 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant "purposefully availed itself of the privileges of Amer-
ican law by trying to create a market for its products here.") In Crimson Semicon· 
ductor, the defendant's representatives visited the United States several times in 
order to negotiate a distributorship agreement that would expand its business in the 
United States. It also advertised in national publications. Id. at 908. See also Lilly, 
supra note 58, at 99 ("Mfiliations with the forum that involve the defendant but are 
instituted by another person do not meet the constitutional- minimum."). 
133 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
134 Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 298. 
135 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 100, at 677-721. 'Indeed, the plaintiffs in 
Asahi Metal brought suit against the California retailer of the allegedly defective 
product. Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 40·41, 702 P.2d at 544, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
136 See Burger King Corp., 105 S. Ct. at 2185; Colwell Realty Investments, Inc. v. 
Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc., 785 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1986). But see Hon-
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tacts under a joint enterprise theory of jurisdiction, a foreign component 
parts manufacturer would be assured of not being haled into a forum because 
of an unrelated distributor's unilateral activity.137 A joint enterprise analysis 
would further ensure that the foreign component parts manufacturer had 
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and privileges of the forum state. 
Finally, such an approach would more concretely establish sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the forum state, thereby guaranteeing "that the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."138 It would, at the 
same time, guard against forum shopping.139 
In addition to adopting a joint enterprise theory of jurisdiction,140 the 
Supreme Court could break with its prior decisions by fashioning a rule 
whereby jurisdiction over an alien corporation in a products liability action 
would only be proper where "general jurisdiction" existed in the forum 
state. The distinction between "general jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdic-
tion" was explained by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall. 141 In that case the Court characterized "specific 
jurisdiction" as follows: "It has been said that when a State exercises 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the 
eywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1975) (interna-
tional manufacturer should not be able to insulate itself from jurisdiction by an 
intermediary or by professing ignorance of the ultimate destination of its products). 
137 See, e.g., Hutson, 584 F.2d at 833, where the court, sitting en banc, concluded 
that an Italian corporation which had sold a chain to a British company which in turn 
sold it in the United States lacked sufficient contacts with an Arkansas forum: 
Weissenfels' contacts with Arkansas consist only of the fortuitous introduc-
tion of Weissenfels products into the forum state through the decision of Frank 
Fehr & Co., a British company. Weissenfels neither manufactured the defective 
chain nor sold or marketed it in the United States. Weissenfels' only apparent 
connection with the chain was that at one time it repacked and resold it to Frank 
Fehr & Co .... Weissenfels did not consciously solicit or purposefully avail 
itself of the privilege to conduct business in the forum state .... The Fehr Co. 
exercises control over the selection of the customers and other marketing deci-
sions relating to the sale of the Weissenfels product which it purchases. 
584 F.2d at 837. The court also observed that while Arkansas had an interest in 
providing a forum for its residents who are injured by defective products of foreign 
corporations, the plaintiffs in the action "do not suffer from a dearth of available 
defendants." Id. at 837 n.l. See International Products Liability, supra note 104, 
where the author concludes that the dispositive fact in Hutson was Weissenfels' 
status as a distributor rather than a manufacturer. 
138 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
139 See supra note 131. 
140 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
141 Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is exercising 'specific juris-
diction' over the defendant. "142 The Court then defined "general jurisdic-
tion": 
When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit 
not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, 
the State has been said to be exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the 
defendant. 143 
In order for general jurisdiction to exist, continuous and systematic general 
business contacts are required. l44 A lesser quantum of contacts will suffice 
for specific jurisdiction. 145 The standard for determining whether continuous 
and systematic contacts exist has been equated with that for determining 
whether a corporation is "doing business" within the meaning of section 
1391(c).146 Under this approach, "if a corporation is doing enough business 
that it would be subject to general jurisdiction , it would be 'doing business'" 
under section 1391(c).147 
As a standard for gauging the propriety of a state's exercise of jurisdiction , 
the continuous and systematic general business contacts test, if equated with 
the "doing business" standard of section 1391(c),148 offers assurances that 
an alien corporation's contacts with the forum state will be sufficiently great 
that the exercise of jurisdiction over it would not be the source of surprise or 
unfairness. 149 Such a standard would have great utility by eliminating any 
142 Id. at 414 n.8 (1984) (citing in support von Mehren & Tmutman,Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1144-64 (1966». 
143 Id. at 414 n.9 (citing in support Brilmayer, HolV Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 80-81; von Mehren & 
Tmutman,1 urisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 
1136-44 (1966)). 
144 !d. at 415; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. at 779; Perkins v. 
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). 
145 15 C. WRIGHT A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3811, at 118 n.65 (1985). Jurisdiction may be premised simultaneously on genemi 
and specific jurisdiction, of course, where a suit is based on the defendant's forum-
related contacts in a forum where the defendant also has continuous and systematic 
general business contacts. 
146 See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 3811, at 119 n.68 (1985). 
147 !d. 
148 Such an equation has been in some of the venue cases construing the "doing 
business" language of section 1391(c). See, e.g., Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Bakery & 
Confectionary Union, 565 F. Supp. 286, 290 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("A corpomtion is 
present within the forum district when its activities there have not only been continu-
ous and systematic but also give rise to the liability sued on .... "). 
149 In effect, such a standard would be equivalent to the "presence" test used by 
the Supreme Court prior to its International Shoe decision to determine the propriety 
of exercising jurisdiction over corporate defendants. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Read-
ing Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) ("A foreign corpomtion is amenable 
to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing 
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need for inquiry into such questions as whether or not the foreign corpora-
tion had "knowledge" that its allegedly defective products would be indi-
rectly sold in the forum. Such corporate knowledge which, in effect was 
made synonymous with contacts in Asahi Metal,lS0 is too tenuous a standard 
upon which to exclusively base aforum's assertion of jurisdiction. Under the 
California Supreme Court's analysis, had Cheng Shin not informed Asahi 
that its valves would enter the U.S. market, Asahi would not have had the 
requisite knowledge upon which jurisdiction was based. lsl Asahi was found 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts on a fortuitous 
event-that Cheng Shin mentioned to Asahi that the United States was one 
of several ultimate destinations for its parts. A much more rational basis for 
jurisdiction would be one premised on general jurisdiction interpreted in 
light of the "doing business" standard of section 1391(c). Under that stan-
dard, an alien corporation would be fairly apprised in advance that it could 
be sued only in those forums where it has continuous and systematic busi-
ness contacts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Asahi Metal decision has stretched the Internatonal Shoe minimum 
contacts test to the constitutional breaking point. It is patently unfair and 
unreasonable to subject a foreign manufacturer of a component part to a 
products liability defense in a forum with which it has absolutely no direct 
contacts and with which it has indirect and attenuated contacts solely by 
virtue of the unilateral activity of an unrelated third party. When it reviews 
the Asahi Metal case, the Supreme Court should refine its minimum contacts 
standard by requiring that such contacts be shown to be substantial before a 
state may properly exercise jurisdiction in a products liability action over a 
remote foreign manufacturer of a component part. 
In the interests of promoting free and reasonably unfettered international 
trade, Congress should pass legislation pursuant to its commerce clause 
power that would regulate the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign compo-
nent parts manufacturers in products liability actions. Congress should also 
enact a national products liability law so that our foreign trading partners 
could more rationally evaluate and plan for the risks and costs of doing 
business in the United States. t 
business within the State in such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the 
inference that it is present there."}. See also Lilly, supra note 58, at 98-99 ("the 
principal cases support the general conclusion that the notion of territoriality, 
reaffirmed in Hanson, remains deeply embedded in the Supreme Court's thinking"); 
International Products Liability, supra note 104, at 322. 
150 Asahi Metal, 39 Cal. 3d at 48-50, 702 P.2d at 550-51,216 Cal. Rptr. at 392-95. 
151 See id. at 48-49, 702 P.2d at 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 392 ("When Asahi sold valve 
assembles to Cheng Shin with knowledge that they would be placed in tubes sold in 
California, it purposefully availed itself of the California market and the benefits and 
protections of California's laws."). 
t At the time this article went to print, the United States Supreme Court handed 
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down a plurality decision reversing the California Supreme Court and remanding 
Asahi Metal. 55 U.S.L. W. 4197 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987). Except for Justice Scalia, all of 
the Justices found that California's exercise of personal jurisdiction in Asahi Metal 
constituted an unreasonable and unfair violation of the Due Process Clause. [d. at 
4199. 
The Court could not agree, however, on a minimum contacts standard. Taking a 
narrow view of the stream-of-commerce theory which the Court set out in Worldwide 
Volkswagen, Justice O'Connor Uoined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Powell and 
Scalia) concluded that, to satisfy the "purposeful availment" test for a minimum 
contacts finding, more is necessary than to merely place the product into the stream-
of-commerce with an awareness that the product will find its way into the forum state. 
Rather, there must be "additional conduct" indicating an intent to serve the forum 
state's market. [d. at 4199. 
Justice Brennan Uoined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun) similarly 
concluded that awareness that the product is being marketed in the forum state is 
necessary to satisfy the Due Process Clause, but that no additional showing of 
conduct is needed. /d. at 4200-01. Writing separately, Justice Stevens Uoined by 
Justices White and Blackmun) noted that finding California's exercise of jurisdiction 
unreasonable and unfair under the Due Process Clause rendered unnecessary any 
examination of minimum contacts. [d. at 4202. 
It appears, therefore, that the Supreme Court's analysis of Asahi Metal is in accor-
dance with the author's analysis to the extent both believe the California Supreme 
Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction was unreasonable. However, the United 
States Supreme COUIt seems not to have refined the minimum contacts standard as 
the author advocated in this article. 
